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COLLECTION OF "FORFEITED" REAL
ESTATE TAXES IN ILLINOIS*
WiLLiAm H. SPECKt

BOUT 250,ooo parcels of Cook County real estate, almost oneAfourth

the total number in the county, are "forfeited" to the

L
State each year for nonpayment of property taxes." The Revenue
Act of 1939 provides that tax delinquent properties not sold at the annual
tax sales are "forfeited to the State of Illinois. '2Tax buyers at the annual
sales purchase properties in order to collect the taxes with heavy penalties
from the delinquent owners, and select only those delinquent properties on
which the prospects of early payment are good. The properties remaining
unsold-those "forfeited"--are, therefore, mostly the unwanted residue,
which continue delinquent year after year and which have frequently been
abandoned by their owners. The term "forfeited" carries a connotation of
change in ownership which the actualities deny, for the State makes no
claims to title or possession and the properties remain on the tax rolls.
The term means only that the properties become liable to the collection
methods which are the subject of this article.
The importance of these 25o,ooo parcels does not lie in the loss of tax
revenue. In recent years only 3 or 4 per cent of the real estate levy has remained uncollected.3 The importance lies in the removal from economic
use of one-fourth the real estate parcels in the county. These parcels are
chiefly lots in vacant subdivisions, dilapidated structures and lots in slum
and blighted areas, and old and obsolete buildings elsewhere. The accumulated taxes constitute an obstacle to economic use. A prospective purchaser often finds that the delinquency amounts to more than the property is worth and that the settlement methods are too expensive and too
dilatory. The owner clings to his title in the faint hope that he may some* This article is part of a larger study, Tax Sales and Tax Titles in Illinois, in preparation.

t Research Associate (Assistant Professor), University of Chicago Law School.
I Report of Edmund J. Brennan, Direct Department of Central Services, Cook County,
Illinois, to the Board of Commissioners (March 4, 1949).
2Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) C. X20, § 727 (Illinois Revenue Act of 1939, § 246). All section references without further designation are to the Illinois Revenue Act of 1939, Ill. Rev. Stat.
(1947) c. 120, §§ 482 ff.
3 Brennan, op. cit. supra note i.
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time be able to sell the property for more than the taxes. Meanwhile the
properties become an economic desert.
The Illinois statutes afford four means of collecting or clearing off the
delinquent taxes on forfeited properties. Two-the redemption of forfeitures and the civil action-permit no reduction of taxes legally due.
The other two-the so-called "three-officer" plan and the forfeiture foreclosure-permit sale for what the properties will bring, regardless of
whether all taxes legally due are paid. Unfortunately, no one of these is a
collection method which a delinquent owner need fear or which affords a
practical means of realizing the taxes from the property. The first merely
affords an opportunity for the owner or a stranger to pay the taxes; the
second has thus far proved unworkable; the last two permit owners to
cancel taxes for a fraction of the amount due. By a curious twist, tax collection methods become tax cancellation methods. These collection methods will now be taken up in order.
a) Redemptiorn and Purchaseof Forfeited Properties
Section 272 of the Revenue Act of 1939 provides that "any person"
may "redeem or purchase" forfeited properties. The inference that persons other than owners may purchase is made explicit by making 'property
"purchased" expressly "subject to redemption, notice, etc., the same as
if sold at regular public tax sale." This section thus essentially provides
two methods of handling forfeitures, one of redemption by owners and
perhaps other persons with an interest in the land and the other of purchase by strangers.
The procedure to redeem or purchase is fully outlined in the statute.
The redeemer or purchaser applies to the county clerk, the clerk orders the
county collector to receive the amount due, the collector accepts the
amount due and gives a receipt in duplicate; one receipt is countersigned
by the clerk and is retained by the redeemer or purchaser, and. the other is
filed by the clerk. The amount due is the sum of the "total amount of all
taxes, statutory costs, interest prior to forfeiture, printers' fees due thereon" and forfeiture interest at varying rates for particular years, now 12
4
per cent per year or fraction.
When special assessments are included in the forfeiture, the steps are
slightly different. The amount of the specials must be paid to the municipal collector, or City Comptroller in Cook County, and the receipt filed
with the clerk. The forfeiture interest on specials is 12 per cent the first
4Section 272 (a) makes provision for partial redemptions in counties other than Cook upon
payment of the amounts due for one or more prior years beginning with the earliest year.
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year and 6 per cent thereafter, with provision that interest over 7 per cent
may be waived in Cook County.
When the forfeited property is purchased by a stranger, the purchase
is expressly "subject to redemption, notice, etc., the same as if sold at
regular public tax sale" and the receipt is "in the form of a certificate of
purchase." The statute makes no mention of redemption penalties except
as they may be included in the "etc." and are implicit in "certificate of
purchase." However, the only case interpreting this section indicates that
the purchaser is entitled to redemption penalties, for the court said: "From
this it follows that the purchaser of the property at such sale acquires the
same rights and stands in exactly the same position with respect to the
property he would had he become a purchaser of the property at the prior
public tax sale... ."S The court in this case granted mandamus to compel a collector to sell forfeited lands despite the collector's contention that
this section was unconstitutional. It held that the rights of redemption
specified in Section 5 of Article 9 of the Illinois Constitution were expressly preserved by the statute, that under Section 4 of that article once the
property has been offered for sale but not sold at a regular public tax sale
the legislature might provide means of subsequent disposition, and that
the availability of foreclosure of the tax lien did not supersede purchase of
forfeitures. Whether the legislature must still allow the two-year constitutional period of redemption in the disposition of forfeited properties
when the owner has not redeemed for two or more years will not be decided as long as the statute itself allows redemption.
This section is, of course, used by owners to redeem, that is, pay up
their taxes. It has also been used to some extent to purchase taxes. In
Cook County for the years 1943-44, the treasurer's books show sales of

forfeitures amounting to $276,955.38 with some of the large tax buyers
being among the purchasers, but for 1945 they show only $27,934.82 sold.
It is not altogether clear why tax buyers do not more often use this process
rather than the tax sale to pick up properties to hold for redemption.
Their rights, as the court stated above, would apparently be exactly the
same as under purchase at a tax sale (except that taxes due would be increased by at least 12 per cent interest for a fraction of a year). They
might find it more convenient to go over the forfeiture lists at their leisure
instead of following the tax sales, and there would be no bidding even to
threaten to reduce the amount of penalties. Some buyers say that after
the sale all the properties likely to be redeemed have been taken, but the
buyers control the tax sale market and could simply wait until after for5Ziccarelli v. Stuckart, 277 I. 26, 32, zz5 N.E.

192, 194 (I917).
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feiture to make their purchases. The more likely explanation is that a
mass shift of tax buyers from the annual tax sale to the purchase of forfeitures would be such a brazen display of control over the market and
would raise so many complaints from taxpayers who would thereby be
subject to an extra 12 per cent interest that county collectors would refuse to cooperate.
As a means of collection, the purchase or redemption of forfeitures has
no coercive force. The collector can do little but wait for owners or strangers to come forward. A stranger who purchases becomes a mere tax certificate and title holder, and has no means of compelling the owner to pay
the taxes.
b) Civil Action for Taxes
Section 275 permits two types of actions for personal judgments for
"taxes and special assessments on forfeited property." The first type is by
"the county board" "in the name of the People of the State of Illinois"
"for the whole amount due.. .

."

The second is by "any county, city,

town, school district or other municipal corporation to which any such
tax or special assessment may be due.., in its own name ... for the
amount.

. .

due any such corporation. ..

."

The cases indicate that many

local government bodies, apparently dissatisfied with the efforts of the
county to collect their taxes, have attempted to bring their own actions
with their own attorneys. Only the government bodies named, however,
can bring these actions. Thus, the board of education 6 or the trustees of
schools7 cannot sue for the school district, and the People cannot sue for
the use of any school district or the school trustees.8 The Illinois Supreme
Court has further reduced the scope of these actions by holding that a
personal judgment for delinquent special assessments violates Section 9
of Article 9 of the Constitution. 9 Special taxation, the court reasoned,
benefits owners only in proportion to the amount of their contiguous property and therefore can only be a charge on that property, not on the owner
personally; further, special taxation is confined by the Constitution to
"contiguous property," not to the owners thereof.
The prerequisites of suit are taxes due "on forfeited properties." This
language might have been interpreted to require a technically valid assess6 Board of Education v. Home Real Estate Improvement Corp., 378 Ill. 298, 38 N.E. 2d

'7 ('94').
7School District No. 88 v. Kooper, 380 Ill. 68, 43 N.E. 2d 542 (1942).
Ibid.
9 City of East St. Louis v. Illinois State Trust Co., 372 Ill. 120, 22 N.E. 2d 944 (1939);
Craw v. Village of Tolono, 96 Ill. 255 (i88o).
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ment, levy, and extension of the taxes together with a valid collection
process to forfeiture. An early appellate court case seemed to go almost
that far, saying that "to constitute a valid forfeiture, all of the steps provided by the statute must have been substantially complied with," naming particularly the notice, judgment, process of sale, offer of sale by a
proper officer, and failure to sell for want of bidders. ° But the Supreme
Court in a case holding that the failure of the record to show advertisement of delinquent lands did not defeat the action, stated a much more
lenient rule:
It must be borne in mind the present suit was not instituted for the purpose of ascertaining whether the proceedings in the county court, culminating in the judgment
against the lot charged with the taxes now sought to be recovered, strictly conforms
to all the requirements of the statute, as in a case where the validity of a tax title is
involved. On the contrary, this is simply a common law action of debt, to recover the
town taxes due on the lot in question, for the years 1875, 1877, 1878, and 1879.
In all cases where there has been a forfeiture of land for the taxes justly due upon it,
this action will lie against the owner, notwithstanding omissions or irregularities have
occurred in the tax proceedings which would be fatal to a tax title founded thereon.
We have no doubt that one of the chief objects the legislature had in view in adopting
this act, was to afford a safe and simple remedy for the collection of taxes, where, by
reason of defects in the proceedings against the land itself, purchasers would be deterred from buying at tax sales. We hold, therefore, that it is sufficient to charge the
owner, in any case of this character, where there has been a forfeiture, in fact, of delinquent land at a regular tax sale for the taxes legally due thereon.-I

This leniency is probably the result of the fact that this action is like the
contested litigation usually handled by courts, with personal service on the

taxpayer and full opportunity to raise all defenses, and is not a summary,
almost administrative proceeding to collect taxes with only published notice.
The lenient rule on prerequisites for suit is offset by permitting the taxpayer to raise any objections he may have to the tax. The statute provides:
*.. the fact that real estate or personal property is assessed to a person, firm or
corporation, shall be prima facie evidence that such person, firm or corporation was
the owner thereof, and liable for the taxes for the year or years for which the assessment was made, and such fact may be proved by the introduction in evidence of the
proper assessment book or roll, or other competent proof.
The People make a prima facie case by offering the tax judgment, sale, redemption, and forfeiture record and proving that the defendants were
xo Smith v. People, 3 Ill. App. 38o, 384 (1879).
xxSanderson v. Town of LaSalle, 117 Ill. IM7,174, 7 N.E. 114, 115 (i886); cf. People for the
use of Christian County v. Davis, 112 Ill. 272, 282 (1884); see Greenwood v. Town of LaSalle,
137 Ill. 225, 26 N.E. io89 (r89i); Carrington v. People, 195 Ill. 484, 63 N.E. 163 (1902).
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owners.2 The
suit must be brought against the person assessed for the
3

'property. The case thus made, however, is only prima facie, and the
court has said: "Such actions are subject to all such defenses as are allowable and proper in an application by the collector for judgment for delinquent taxes in the county court.' 4 The court went on to name specifically the defenses of lack of authority to tax, assessment of property not
subject to taxation, and fraudulent over-assessment of property. The
court has denied judgments where the property was tax exempt' 5 and
where the tax was invalid. 6 This language does not, however, mean that
after appearing and contesting the tax in the county court on the application for tax judgment, a taxpayer may contest the tax again in the civil
action. 7 The judgment preceding the forfeiture thus is given finality as a
prerequisite for bringing the action of debt but no more finality as to the
liability for the tax than it is given in collateral attacks upon tax titles. An
unsatisfied judgment in the annual judgment and sale process or in any
other method of collecting taxes does not bar this action, and vice versa. 8
The statute describes the suit as "a civil action" brought "in any court
of competent jurisdiction." Before the adoption of the Illinois Civil Practice Act in 1933 the action was in debt and was not based on a contract.' 9

It may be brought in a justice of the peace court.2 0 The suit is not in rein
for taxes but is a personal, civil action upon a tax liability," so that the
122,
484, 63 N.E. 163 (1902); Harding v.People, 202 Inl.
12 Carrington v. People, i95 Ill.
66 N.E. 962 (1903).
'3 Com'rs of Big Lake Special Drainage District v. Com'rs of Highways of Sand Ridge, igg
Ill. 132, 64 N.E. 1094 (1902); Coombs v. People, 198 InI. 586, 64 N.E. 1o56 (i9o2); Carrington
381 (i88o). The language
484, 63 N.E. 63 (19o2); Biggins v. People, 96 Ill.
v. People, 195 Ill.
in some of the cases is not clear as to whether the owner at the time of the assessment or at
474, 477, 2 N.E. 484,
the time of the levy or the lien is liable, e.g., Bowman v. People, 114 Ill.
485 (i885) where the court said the defendant must be "such owner at the date such taxes
become a charge against the real estate."
'4

Com'rs of Big Lake Special Drainage District v. Com'rs of Highways of Sand Ridge,

199 Inl.
132, 134, 64 N.E. 1094, 1094 (1902); see Neal Institute Co. v. Stuckart, 281 Il.526,
117 N.-E. 1012 (1917).

is Elmwood Cemetery Co.v.People, 204 Il 468, 68 N.E.Soo (I903).
Belleville
" Ohio & M. R.Co. v.Com'rs of Highways, 117 In. 279, 7 N.E. 663 (I886); cf.
Nail Co. v. People, 98 IL.399 (iS8i).
'7 Harding v. People, 202 Ill. 122, 66 N.E. 962 (1903).
18People for use of Christian County v. Davis, 112 I. 272 (1884); People v. Stahl, ioi Ill.
211, 5 N.-. 536 (i886); cf. Byrne v.
346 (1882); see People ex rel. Wernsing v. Winter, ii6 Ill.
Town of LaSalle, X23 Ill. 58r, 14 N.E. 679 (i888).
'9 People v. The Old Second National Bank of Aurora, 347 In1. 64o, iSo N.E. 4o8 (z932);
People v. Dummer, 274 I1l. 637, 113 N.E. 934 (igi6).
"0For example, People v. Stahl, ioi Ill.
346 (1882); Kepley v. Jansen, 107 In. 79 (883).
"Douthett v. Kettle, 104 ll. 356 (1882); Langlois v. People,

2

212

In.75, 72 N.E. 28 (1904).

HeinOnline -- 16 U. Chi. L. Rev. 660 1948-1949

FORFEITED REAL ESTATE TAXES IN ILLINOIS

procedure is that of civil actions rather than that of actions for taxes. The
sale on execution is made by the sheriff as in judgment sales instead of by
the county collector as in tax sales,- and the tracts must be offered separately, en masse, and in every combination instead of in consecutive order.2 The period allowed for redemption is the fifteen months prescribed
for judgment sales and not the two years fixed in the Constitution for tax
sales.2 The judgment has only the priority of a civil judgment and not
that of the lien for taxes, so that it is subject to homestead,25 prior mortgages,& and probably dower,27 at least when the judgment is for taxes
upon other lands. The interest on the judgment is the legal rate and not
the much heavier forfeiture interest on taxes. 2' The statute expressly allows any of the government bodies which may sue for taxes to become pur4

9
chasers at the sale.2

The collecting officers have seldom resorted to the civil action to collect real property taxes. One officer in Cook County estimated that not
more than one or two suits are brought each year. The principal reason
offered for the lack of use is that expensive, individual actions must be
brought against each taxpayer who usually is difficult to find and who can
raise innumerable objections to the taxes. This method of collection is not
adapted to large scale use, and the costs of suing would probably in many
instances exceed the taxes collected. Further, even after judgment has
been obtained, prior claims will in many instances preclude execution.
Finally, most taxpayers do not realize they are personally liable for real
estate taxes, and resort to this remedy on a large scale would be very unpopular.
An indication of the results probable from the use of civil actions to
collect real property taxes is perhaps given by its results in collecting per- Langlois v. People, 212 Ill. 75, 72 N.E. 28 (i9o4).
23Douthett

v. Kettle,

1o4

I1.356

(1882); cf. Clark v. Zaleski, 253 Inl. 63, 69, 97 N.E.

272,

275 (1912).
24 Douthett

v. Kettle, 104 Ill. 356 (1882).

25 Douthett

v. Winter, 1o8 Ill. 330 (1884).

79 (1883).
26Kepley v. Jansen, 107 Ill.

27 The personal judgment for taxes may be collectrd in the same manner as an ordinary
judgment. See Greenwood v. Town of LaSalle, 137 II. 225, 230, 26 N.E. lo8g, io9o (i8g);
Byrne v. Town of LaSalle, 123 Ill. 581,584, 14 N.E. 679, 68o (i888). Ordinary judgments are
subordinate to dower. See Sisk v. Smith, 6 In. 5o3, 5o8 (I844). Consult Herbert, The Liquidation of the Lien of Taxes on Real Estate in Illinois, i John Marshall L. Q. 26, 47 (1935).
28 Greenwood v. Town of LaSalle, 137 Il. 225, 26 N.E. io89 (189i). But judgment may
include penalties, interest, and costs prior to forfeiture. Carrington v. People, 195 InI. 484,
63 N.E. 163 (1902).
29 Douthett v. Kettle, 104 Ill. 356 (1882).
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sonal property taxes. During the thirties civil actions for personal property
taxes were disappointing: a large proportion of summonses (as high as 84
per cent in one period) returned not found; substantial reductions in the
taxes by court order; a very small proportion of satisfied judgments (as
low as 6 or 7 per cent). 30
This action is probably now only of practical use against large, conspicuous taxpayers with assets easily subject to execution. But given an
adequate clerical and legal staff, complete tax and title records, and a
real desire to collect, civil actions might bring good results against taxpayers who neglect to pay taxes although owning other resources. That
the costs and inconvenience of the individual actions might exceed the
collections from the individual defendants would not necessarily make actions uneconomical, for the wholesome effect upon payments by other taxpayers or by the same defendant in later years might more than offset any
initial loss.
c) The "Three-Officer" Plan
The two preceding methods necessitate payment of taxes in full. In the
civil action for taxes the amount due can be reduced for illegal levies or
assessments and only part of the judgment may be collectible, but the full
amount of unpaid legal taxes remains a lien on the land. Often these taxes
amount to such a large proportion of the value of the land that owners
will not redeem and no buyer can afford to purchase and pay up the taxes.
The first method by which land may be cleared of taxes legally due is the
special sale or "three-officer" plan.3' The key sentence of Section 246 provides that "whenever the county judge, county clerk and county treasurer
shall certify that the taxes and special assessments not withdrawn from
collection on forfeited lands equal or exceed the actual value of such lands,
the officer directed by law to expose for sale lands for delinquent taxes
shall.., offer for sale to the highest bidder the tract or lands... "
The three cases and the few Attorney General opinions on this section
leave many unanswered questions. The statute mentions only "taxes and
special assessments" as the sum against which the value of the land is to
be measured so that interest, costs, and penalties probably cannot be included. It refers only to "forfeited lands" so that if there has been one
forfeiture, all taxes due even though not forfeited may probably be in"oResearch Department, Illinois Legislative Council, Tax Delinquency in Illinois with Particular Reference to Cook County 66-67 (April 1939); Report of the Chicago City Council
Committee on Consolidation, Reorganization, and Taxation 2 (Oct. 17, 1939); ibid., at 4 (Feb.
7, 1940).

"1Consult Woods, Three Officer Plan for Quick Liquidation of Tax Judgment Liens in

Illinois, 7 John Marshall L. Q. 341 (1942).
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cluded. The cases give no hint whether the courts will adopt the interpretation of "forfeiture in fact" as in the civil action for taxes or will require a
technically valid forfeiture; but the fact that the sale here is made by the
collector upon the certificate of the officers without further judicial approval of the taxes or further opportunity to raise objections may influence the courts to insist upon a technically valid forfeiture. No cases illuminate the phrase "the actual value of such lands," although one Attorney
General opinion uses the phrase "the fair market value of the property"
as the equivalent.32 Mention of this method of collection in several cases
may indicate court approval of its constitutionality, 33 but that issue has
never been determined.
The first step in the procedure is to obtain the certificate of the three
officers. An appellate court holds that a taxpayer cannot on proof that the
taxes due on his property exceed its value compel them to make out a certificate, for this method is only one of several for collecting taxes which
these officers may in their discretion pursue.3 4 Then there must be given
"ten days' notice of the time and place of sale together with a description
of the tract or lands so to be offered." The statute says nothing of how the
notice must be given. One Attorney General opinion determined that the
notice should be mailed to the owners or persons assessed just as notice is
mailed to these persons after judgment for taxes and at least five days
before the sale. 35 Such notice would only prompt owners to pay up their
taxes to avoid the sale and bring the owners to bid at the sale. But if the
taxes exceed the value of the property, it is unlikely that the owners will
pay up, and the doctrine that no person liable for taxes can buy at a tax
sale (his purchase operates only as a payment of taxes) would probably
preclude owners from buying at this sale. 36 A year earlier another Attorney General opinion determined that notice by publication was contemplated.37 Such notice would attract outside bidders and seems more nearly in accord with the purpose of the section. Perhaps, to be safe, both the
owners and outsiders should be given notice. The county collector sells the
land to the highest bidder. In the event no bid is received, the property remains on the forfeiture books38 The buyer receives a "certificate of pur32

Ops. Ill. Att'y Gen.

(1925),

at

259.

" Particularly see Ziccarelli v. Stuckart, 277 111.26, 3o, iiS N.E. 192, 194 (1917).
34 People ex rel. Rossiter v. Wagemann, 293 Ill. App. 37, 12 N.E. 2d 4o (1937).
35Ops. Ill. Att'y Gen. (1925), at 259.
36See, for example, Peabody v. Burri, 255 Il.
194 Ill.
41, 6i N.E. 1051 (Igo').
37 Ops. Ill. Att'y Gen. (1923-24), at 430.

592, 99

N.E. 69o (i912); Hanna v. Palmer,
38 Tbid.
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chase ...

as in other cases in this Act provided," which the Attorney

General interprets to be the same as that in the ordinary tax judgment and
sale process. 39 The collector distributes the proceeds pro rata to the taxing
40
bodies and can subtract only the printer's fee as .costs.

The statute makes no mention of redemption. Attorney General opinions, however, decide and assume that the constitutional two-year redemption period for tax sales applies.4' Since the property is sold to the
highest bidder and not by bidding on redemption penalties, there are no
penalty bids. Redemption is made upon payment of the amount for which
the property was sold,4 subsequent taxes paid by the purchaser, interest
on subsequent taxes (in one opinion "legal interest" 43 and in another the
7 per cent specified in the Revenue Act44), and fees for registering title.

Subsequent taxes must be paid, 45 notice of the expiration of the redemption period given,46 and probably affidavits of notice filed as in purchases
at annual tax sales. The statute makes no mention"of the issuance of a
tax deed. Since there are no redemption penalties and since the buyer
must put up some substantial bid instead of merely the fractional part of
the value represented by current taxes due, the only purpose in bidding
would be to obtain the property itself. Attorney General .opinions indicate
that the form of the deed is the same as in the annual tax judgment and
sale process 47 and that the same title is acquired as at the annual tax
8
sale.4
Any procedure involving the compromise of taxes offers an opportunity
for owners to clear up their tax liabilities at substantial savings, and the
cases indicate that taxpayers have attempted to seize the opportunity
afforded by the "three-officer" plan. The recent appellate court case holding that the three officers cannot be compelled to certify when taxes exceed value prevents large-scale resort to this procedure on taxpayer initiative. In an 1888 case after a judgment in debt had been obtained against
him, the taxpayer secured the certificate of the three officers and had the
property sold for less than the taxes due. 49 The court held that the sale did
not discharge the liability for taxes on the previous judgment except to the
extent the taxes were collected, but indicated that the result might have
been different had the county initiated the three-officer proceeding. The
court said: "... we see nothing in the statute from which it may be in39 Ibid. (1925), at 259.
44 1bid. (1929), at 15.
Ibid. (1932), at 653.
Ibid. (1925), at 259; ibid. (1917-18), at io98.
42 Ibid. (I917-18), at Io98; ibid. (1932), at 653.
40

4'

43Ibid. (1917-18), at io98.
49 Byrne

v. Town of LaSaUe,

123

4sIbid. (1925), at 259.
46Ibid. (1943), at 242.
Ibid. and (1925), at
48Ibid. (I915), at 191.

47

I1. 58i, 14 N.E. 679 (i888).
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ferred that the legislature ever intended, by its enactment to aid any person in escaping the payment of his share of the public burden."
Despite the court's admonition, this method has been rarely used and
then only to cancel taxes spectacularly. In Cook County the only use that
observers recall occurred back in i9o8.-0 Downstate in Williamson County
this method was used in 1934 to wipe out much delinquency.S, A building
and loan association filed a petition accompanied by sixteen typewritten
pages listing delinquent properties. The three county officers granted certificates upon the oaths of the owner and two others that the property was
not worth the taxes. Over 5,000 properties were offered. But the returns
were reported as less than one-half cent on the dollar: $io,ooo was recovered out of $2,157,ooo in forfeitures. This experiment thus merely resulted
in the wholesale cancellation of taxes.
The fear that the section will be a means of avoiding payment of taxes,
confirmed by the Williamson County experience, has probably been the
principal reason for its lack of use. Other reasons have been a hesitancy on
the part of the officers to find that taxes exceed value, the reluctance to
deprive an owner of his property by an administrative sale, the inability
to pass any better title than at the ordinary tax sale, the incompleteness
and uncertainty of the statute, and the availability of a much better
method of selling to the highest bidder in the forfeiture foreclosure.
d) ForfeitureForeclosures
Since 18i9 the revenue statutes have provided that real property taxes
are a lien upon the land,5 but for sixty years no method was available to
enforce the lien. In 188o the collecting officers of Madison County brought
a bill in equity to foreclose a tax lien. In Peoplev. Biggins 3 the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that equity had no jurisdiction of such a bill. It
reasoned that the lien was neither equitable nor contractual but was created by statute, that statutory liens "are enforced in the manner prescribed by the law which gave them existence," and that the annual judgment and sale for delinquent taxes is an adequate and complete "manner
prescribed by the law" for enforcement. justice Scott, dissenting, pointed
out that the statutory means of enforcement is not necessarily exclusive
and that unless the lien can be enforced it is useless. The next session of
the legislature in 1881 amended the law to provide that the "lien may be
foreclosed in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction in the name of
the People of Illinois, whenever the taxes for two or more years... have
so Woods, op. cit. supra note 3i, at 341.
s, Research Department, op. cit. supra note 30, at

52.

s2 II. L. (i8ig), p. 3r3.
s 96 Ill. 481 (i88o).
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been forfeited to the state. .... ,,S4 This language has been retained ever
since and sets forth the most popular and indeed the only practical means
of collecting or clearing up the taxes on heavily delinquent properties.
The principle of the Biggins case, that the foreclosure of tax liens can
proceed only as prescribed by law, has continued to be the guiding rule of
equitable tax foreclosures. Thus, in 1932 the authority of an equity court
in aid of its jurisdiction to foreclose taxes to appoint a receiver to take
charge of the property and apply the proceeds from operations to the payment of taxes was denied, ss and that power had also to be supplied by
statute. 6 The Attorney General has ruled that in the foreclosure of a tax
lien no deficiency judgment can be entered against the owner.5 7 And recently the Supreme Court held that a private individual cannot seek an
equitable accounting for taxes58 This principle could not, however, be applied without qualification, for the statute does not completely describe
the procedure. The court has allowed a supplemental confirmation of the
tax deed not provided by statute. Moreover, it is often not clear whether
the statutes applicable to revenue govern exclusively or whether those applicable to foreclosures apply, so that ca'utious attorneys must attempt to
comply with both.
Briefly, the proceedings under Section 216 (formerly Section 253) are as

follows: Whenever real property has been forfeited to the State for the
nonpayment of taxes for two or more years, the county board may request the state's attorney to foreclose the lien of delinquent taxes in a
court of equity. The court determines the amount of taxes due, orders payment of that amount, and upon nonpayment orders the sale of the property by the county collector to the highest bidder. The owner and other
persons interested in the property then have the two year constitutional
period in which to redeem from the sale upon the payment of the bid price
plus interest. The purchaser must pay taxes on the property during this
two year period, must give notice of the expiration of the period of redemption, and is then entitled to the tax deed. The proceedings will now
be discussed in detail."9
The language of the statute is permissive: the "lien may be foreclosed
.. " Nevertheless, an early appellate case translated these words into the
strong language of duty:
S4 Ill. L. (i88i), p. I3O.

ss People v. Straus, 266 Ill. App. 95 (1932).

56Ill. L. (1933), p. 874.
S7Ops. Ill. Att'y Gen. (1938), at i69.

s People ex rel. Morse v. Chambliss, 399 Ill. 151, 77 N.E. 2d x91 (1948).
59 See also Pollak, The Foreclosure of Tax Liens in Illinois, 18 Taxes 95 (1940); Daniels,

Handbook for Illinois Tax Foreclosures (c. X943); 7 Nichols, Illinois Civil Practice §§ 74797507 (Supp., 1948).
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Under this provision of the statute the State's Attorney is the proper officer to file
the bill to foreclose the tax lien under Sec. 253, and undoubtedly it is his duty to do
so, when it shall be known to him that the taxes upon any tract of land in his county
have not been paid and the land has been forfeited for such nonpayment for two or
6
more years. o
This court may have been referring to the duty of the state's attorney to
act upon the request of the county board, for it went on to say that if the
state's attorney neglected his duty, the board might order him to act and
even appoint another attorney. Regardless of this case, the foreclosure has
been treated as an optional, discretionary remedy which the board need
not apply automatically to every tract of forfeited land two years delinquent.
The statute prescribes that the foreclosure action be instituted "in the
name of the People of the State of Illinois," and actions not instituted in
the name of the People are dismissed. Thus, where actions to foreclose
drainage district special assessments were brought in the name of the district instead of the People, the suits were dismissed.6 x No relator is necessary. 62 Section 56a of the Local Improvement Act now authorizes foreclosure of special assessments in the name of the municipality.
The powers and practices of the state's attorneys in relation to these
suits are unclear and various. The state's attorney is the proper person to
institute suit,63 and usually he acts at the request of the county board.
State's attorneys outside Cook County are now allowed a fee of io per
cent of the foreclosure sales, and the State's Attorney of Cook County is
allowed a similar fee of 2 per cent. 6 4 Yet in some instances private attorneys have conducted the cases in the lower courts, and in two opinions the
Supreme Court rejected the contention that their appearance for the
People was fatal error. In one the court said that the collection of revenue
is so important that the bill will not be dismissed because the attorney
bringing suit is not the state's attorney,' and in another it said that the
appearance of another attorney did not affect the rights of the parties and
had in any event been authorized by the Board of. County Commissioners
and ratified by the state's attorney and Attorney General.6 6 Whether the
6o Ward v. City of Alton, 23 Ill. App. 475, 478 (1887).
61 Gauen v. Drainage District, 1i Ill. 446, 23 N.E. 633 (i89o); Sennott v. Moredock and
Ivy Landing Drainage District No. i, i55 Ill. 96, 39 N.E. 567 (i895); cf. Ward v. City of Alton, 23 Ill. App. 475 (1887).
62 People v. Weber, 164 Ill. 4r2, 45 N.E. 723 (1897); Ops. Ill. Att'y Gen. (i93i), at 147.
63People v. Sandvoss, 320 In. App. 239, 5o N.E. 2d 770 (i943).
64Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947), c. 53, § 8.
6s Mix v. People, ix6 Ill. 265, 4 N.E. 783 (i886).
66People v. Straus, 355 Ill. 640, i89 N.E. 877 (i934).
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state's attorneys must foreclose upon the request of the county board is
uncertain. State's Attorney Courtney in Cook County once temporarily
discontinued forfeiture foreclosures contrary to the wishes of the county
board.67 Whether state's attorneys may institute foreclosures without the
consent of the county board is also uncertain. The language of the appellate court already quoted would indicate that it is the duty of the state's
attorney to prosecute forfeiture foreclosures even without the consent of
the county board. Some state's attorneys urge that they have the power
and even the duty to foreclose special assessments with general taxes
without the consent of the municipalities involved and that they may
bring foreclosure actions without express authority from county boards.68
This confusion and division of responsibility necessarily prevents effective
collection and illustrates the need for constitutional revision of the structure of Illinois local government.
In practice the initiative for instituting tax foreclosures has come to lie
neither with the county board nor with the state's attorney but with the
owner or some other person who promises a bid large enough to make foreclosure worth while. Experience has proved that foreclosure without some
assurance of an adequate bid only results in sales for nominal amounts,
sometimes as low as $i.oo per lot, to speculators, encourages delinquency
by offering owners the prospect of clearing off back taxes at a fraction of
their face amount, and neither brings in revenue nor transfers the title to
persons likely to put the land to economic use and keep taxes paid up.
The example usually given of an unsuccessful tax foreclosure without assurance of bids is one during the thirties against lands in Park Ridge subject to $325,000 in taxes.6 9 The first sale brought bids of only $15,ooo to
$16,ooo, which the court disapproved, and a second sale brought still
lower bids of only $12,000, which the court approved despite objections of
inadequacy. Counties have therefore resorted to various devices to make
sure that foreclosures are not used to wipe out taxes at a few cents on the
dollar. The most popular has been the refusal to initiate foreclosures unless some one will guarantee a satisfactory bid. An alternative is to have
the county bid in all properties which do not sell for more than a minimum
fair valuation.
In Cook County the steps by which a private person induces the county
board to institute a tax foreclosure are outlined on a sheet of "Instructions
67Chicago Sun, p. 4,col. 2 (March 28, 1942); ibid. p. 12, col. 7 (March 29, 1942); ibid. p. 24,
col. 5 (March 3o, 1942).
68 Daniels, Handbook of Illinois Tax Foreclosures 17, 19 (c. 1943).
69Research Department, op. cit. supra note 3o, at 51; Chicago Sun, p. 14, col. 6 (April 14,
158, 43 N.E. 2d 997 (1942), the Village of Lansing va1942). In People v. Anderson, 38o Ill.
cated sales where the bids were only $i.oo per lot.
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for Attorneys for Filing Tax Foreclosure Cases." He must fill out
a printed "Information Sheet," submit a photograph of the premises,
write a letter containing certain specified information and promising a
minimum guaranteed bid and the payment of subsequent taxes, and furnish on the printed forms available several copies of complaints, summonses, and affidavits for instituting the action. Until recently the county
board would foreclose only on delinquent taxes for 194o and earlier years,
and taxes for i94I and subsequent years had to be paid in full. On April
21, 1949, however, the board resolved to foreclose taxes through 1946
on vacant property. The former limitation remains in effect for improved
property. From the photograph of the property, the description of the
premises, and the information on taxes and assessments, the Delinquent
Tax Committee of the board determines whether foreclosure for the guaranteed bid is to the advantage of the county. If the board gives its approval, the file is transferred to the state's attorney. He checks the file and
prosecutes the action. Approval by the court is usually a matter of course,
since there is no opposition.
The statutory prerequisite for tax foreclosure is that "the taxes for two
or more years, upon the same description of property, shall have been forfeited to the State." It is settled that this requirement means forfeiture
for the nonpayment of the taxes for two or more years and not two or
more forfeitures, 7° and that all taxes may be included in the foreclosure
whether or not included in the forfeiture. 7z The statute further provides
that the amount shown upon the collector's books "shall be prima facie
evidence of the amount of taxes against the said real property." The serious problem raised by these provisions is the extent to which the right to
institute foreclosure depends upon the validity of the forfeiture and thus
upon the validity of the tax judgment, the sale, and the taxes themselves.
If this requirement means that these steps must all be technically valid
judged by the standards of collateral attack upon the ordinary tax title,
the foreclosure offers no chance of a better title than does the annual tax
sale, for errors which invalidate the latter would also invalidate the former. Perhaps the foreclosure process would offer less chance of passing
good title because the foreclosure itself affords additional opportunities
for error.
The courts have not, however, held that every error in the process leading to the forfeiture renders the forfeiture invalid and prevents the foreclosure. In 1934 the court described its approach as follows:
70 People

v. Weber, 164 Ill.
412, 45 N.E. 723 (x896).

7'Mix v. People, 122 Ill.
641, 14 N.E. 209 (1887).
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In considering the record in this respect [detailed and technical attacks upon the
forfeitures] it is necessary to bear in mind that it is the purpose of the statute to permit an adjustment, accounting and collection of back taxes, regardless of omissions
or irregularities which might be of such character as to be fatal to a tax title and
therefore such as might effectually prevent bidding at a tax sale. The complexity
of our tax-assessing and tax-collecting laws is such as to cast many difficulties in the
path to a valid tax title, and it was obviously the legislative intent in passing section
253 [now section 216] to provide a remedy which would prove beneficial both to the
people and the tax-payer. In equity, with all parties in court, it is at once possible for
the tax-payer to secure for himself all just credits and adjustments and for the people
to correct and overcome all technical objections.... The section under consideration,
other
being remedial, must be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose, and any
72
construction would not only fail that purpose but render it entirely nugatory.

It had earlier based liberal treatment on the powers of a court of equity.
In a foreclosure suit where some of the taxes were claimed to be illegal and
thus to preclude foreclosure, the Supreme Court indicated that equity
could take an account to determine what taxes were legally due and that
the taxpayercould not set aside a forfeiture without paying what was due
in equity and good conscience.7 3 Therefore, the inclusion of any illegal
taxes which voids an annual tax judgment, sale, and title does not void
the forfeiture for purposes of a tax foreclosure.
This attitude of the court is implemented by using the various saving
provisions that have proved of little help in protecting tax titles to better
effect in protecting tax foreclosures. Thus, in 1930 the court relied on the
fact that the judgment of the county court is conclusive except where the
tax has been paid or the land is not liable for the tax.7 4 It held that the insufficiency of the certificate of publication of the delinquent list could not
be raised because the county court had found that due notice had been
given, that the filing of the delinquent list with one "Mike Godfrey,
Clerk" who was both county clerk and clerk of the county court was a
satisfaction of the requirement that it be filed with the clerk of the county
court, and that errors and omissions in the dates on the certificates of levy
were informalities not affecting substantial justice. Earlier the court
held that the confirmation of special assessment bonds could not be attacked collaterally and that objectors were estopped because as commissioners of the drainage district they ha d agreed to an order compromising
certain differences with the bondholders.7 5 Still earlier the court held that
72People

v. Straus, 355 Ill. 64o, 643, 189 N.E. 877, 879 (i934).

73Hammond v. People, 169 II1. 545, 48 N.E. 573 (,897).
74

People v. Miller, 339 II1. 573, i7i N.E. 672 (193o); d. People v. Conleur, 294 Ill. 139,

N.E. 339 (1920) on the treatment of imperfections.
7s People v. Weber, 64 Ill. 412, 45 N.E. 723 (I896).
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fraudulent overassessment and reassessment did not prevent foreclosure,
that assessment in the wrong name was no defense for the owner, and that
objections to taxes for various bonds should have been raised when the
objectors appeared at the county court's confirmation of the bonds76
These cases merely follow the pattern set by the first case applying the
tax foreclosure process which held that, even though the tax judgments
for previous years were erroneous, the back taxes themselves and the
penalties could be added to the current taxes and that the remedy for
erroneous judgments was to appeal them. 7
One case only, People v. Henckler,71disturbs the finality of the tax judgment and forfeiture in a foreclosure proceeding. There the bill to foreclose
was dismissed because the clerk's certificate of the tax judgment contained
a scrawl only and thus was not "attested by the clerk, under seal of the
court.... ." as required by statute. The court reasoned that the statute
authorized foreclosure only when the taxes for two or more years had been
forfeited to the state, that the tax collector had no authority to sell for
taxes except in compliance with the law upon a certificate under seal of a
judgment for taxes, that the clerk's scrawl was not the seal of the court,
and that since there was no valid sale there was no valid forfeiture.
The conclusion seems to be that once there has been a valid forfeiture
for the nonpayment of some valid taxes for at least two years the prerequisites for tax foreclosure have been satisfied. That several judgments and
forfeitures are invalid is irrelevant provided one is good. Even with respect to the forfeiture relied upon, the fact that part of the taxes are invalid is irrelevant because the court of equity will inquire into the objections and foreclose only for taxes actually due. Moreover, the court has
more effectively used the statutory finality of the tax judgment and the
various saving provisions in tax foreclosures than in annual tax judgments
and sales. Greater finality is given the previous tax collecting procedure in
foreclosure than is given it in the civil action for personal judgment; for in
the civil action the court has expressly stated that all objections may be
raised which might have been raised on application for judgment, including fraudulent overassessment, whereas in the foreclosure the court has
indicated no such liberal ground for objections and has expressly excluded
fraudulent overassessment. 79 In both the civil action and the foreclosure
one of the reasons for the finality is that the taxpayer is afforded another
opportunity after personal notice to contest any illegal taxes so that tech76Mix v. People, 116 Ill. 265, 4 N.E. 783 (1886).
77 Biggins v. People, io6 Ill. 270 (1883).

78137 Ill. 580, 27 N.E. 602 (189i).

79Mix v. People,

i6 Ill. 265, 4 N.E. 783 (1886).
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nicalities are not necessary to protect him. It should be noted that these
cases have arisen on objections to foreclosure for taxes and not later in collateral attack upon the title obtained from the sale so that a stricter rule
could still be adopted in the latter situation. But all parties to the foreclosure would be bound by the decree and precluded from collateral attack.
All persons should be named as defendants whose interests are to be
foreclosed. On the surface the statements of the Supreme Court on parties
seem inconsistent. Thus, in Peoplev. Weber, ° the taxpayer testified that he
was married and resided on the property with his wife and that there were
two mortgages on the property. He insisted that the wife and mortgagees
were necessary parties. The court said:
The homestead is not exempt from the lien for taxes, and that lien is superior to
all the others. The interest of the wife or the mortgagees could not, under any circumstances or by any proof, be made superior to the lien for taxes, and as that question could not be made the subject of litigation, we see no reason for making any person defendant except the owner in possession of the land who is liable for the taxes,
any more than in any other form of proceeding for the collection of such taxes. Every
person interested in the premises must, at his peril, see that the lien for taxes is
discharged.
But ten years earlier the court had noted:
It is said others have an interest in these lands and lots who should be made parties
to the suit. If there are any such persons, they, not being made parties, will not-be
bound by the decree in this case, nor will their interest in the property be affected
thereby. But that ought not, so far as we can see, prevent foreclosure as to the interest
of the defendants. 8'
And fifteen years later the court struck down a bill to review a tax foreclosure proceeding on the ground that the petitioner, Emma Glos, who
claimed a one-third interest by quit claim deed from her husband, could
not have been affected by the foreclosure since she was not named a
party:
As Emma Glos was not a party or privy to the original foreclosure proceedings the
alleged notice as to said supplemental proceedings could not in any way preclude
her from questioning the finding either in said original or supplemental proceedings....
The foreclosure proceedings being invalid on their face so far as they attempted to
affect the rights of Emma J. Glos, the decree in title is no cloud on her title and there
8
is no occasion for equitable interference. 2
The holdings in these cases are not inconsistent: In the Weber case the
8o 64 Ill. 412, 416, 45 N.E. 723, 724 (i896).

8zMix v. People, 116 Ill. 265, 278, 4 N.E. 783, 788 (x886).
8, Glos v. People, 259111. 332, 341, 344, I02 N.E. 763, 766, 768 (1913); cf. People v. Evans,
262 Il. 235, 1o4 N.E. 646 (i914).
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court merely held that the absence of the wife and the mortgagees did not
preclude foreclosure as to the owners, and in the others it held that the interests of persons who were not made parties were not affected. But the
fact that the interests of persons not made parties are not cut off is a very
good reason for making them parties despite the contrary statement in the
Weber case. The rule here seems to be the same as that in mortgage foreclosures: a senior mortgagee foreclosing need not name as defendants
junior lien holders, but the rights of redemption of such holders not made
defendants are not foreclosed.51 The issue of the effect of a tax foreclosure
on interests not made defendants is not likelyto arise often because prudent
attorneys try to name as defendants all known interests. If all claimants
are named defendants their interests can be cut off by foreclosing the superior tax lien and the proceedings can serve an auxiliary purpose of quieting
title. One state's attorney recommends that the county, county clerk,
county treasurer, and any municipality levying special assessments with
its clerk, collector, and treasurer also be made defendants because the
84
decree will contain directions to them.
The printed bill of complaint furnished by the Cook County State's
Attorney provides for naming as "Unknown Owners" the holders of notes
and interest coupons secured by a deed of trust and the beneficiaries under a trust and the "unknown heirs and devisees of
- deceased." The
inclusion of beneficiaries as unknown owners is made possible by a decision
that special assessment bond and voucher holders need not be made parties to a suit by a municipality to foreclose special assessments15 The Supreme Court noted "that very often the bondholders are so numerous that
to require them to be made parties in every suit to foreclose the lien of
special assessments would be to impose an unreasonable and oppressive
burden on the municipality." It pointed out that the beneficiaries of a
trust are not necessary parties to an action to foreclose their interest where
they are adequately represented by others, here by the municipality. To
the bondholders' contention that the municipality was adversely interested because foreclosure of the special assessments would leave its own
lien for general taxes paramount, the court replied that the municipality
would be presumed to do its duty and would desire to assure payment of
bondholders to facilitiate the financing of local improvements in the future.
83 Reeve, The Law of Mortgages and Foreclosures in Illinois §§ 478, 493 (1932); Jones, A
Treatise on the Law of Mortgages of Real Property §HJ78o, 1781 (8th ed., 1928).
84 Daniels, Handbook of Illinois Tax Foreclosures i8 (c. 1943).
8
s Village of Lansing v. Sundstrom, 379 Ill. 121, 39 N.E. 2d 987 (1942); People v. Sandvoss,
320 Ill. App. 239, 5o N.E. 2d 770 (3943).
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The result of these cases on parties is that all persons interested in the
property must be made parties if their interests are to be affected, except
that the beneficiaries of a trust need not be made parties when their interest is represented by a party. Defendants should include all owners of
the fee including contingent and reversionary interests, all tenants for life
or years, the executors or administrators of an estate, the person last taxed
or assessed, all lienholders, trustees, judgment creditors, persons in possession, the county and municipal officers mentioned, and all other persons
denominated "Unknown Owners." Attorneys planning to complete a
foreclosure by redemption (as discussed below), however, sometimes deliberately omit parties in order to discourage bidding by outsiders.
Service upon all parties is facilitated by a recent amendment providing
that whenever the taxes for five or more years have been forfeited, notice
may be given to owners and parties interested by publication.86 The notice must be in the form and contain the information specified and must be
published for three successive weeks in a newspaper in the county. Occupants must still be served by summons or publication as required by law
for equitable foreclosures. This provision was adopted in 1943 to facilitate
foreclosures by state's attorneys without the staffs necessary for title
searches to find owners for personal service, but doubt as to its constitutionality has limited its use.
This 1943 amendment to Section 216 also provides in a separate paragraph: "An action to foreclose the lien for delinquent taxes under the provisions of this Act is hereby declared to be an action in rem."' 87 If "this
Act" refers to the whole of Section 216, this language might make it unnecessary to name as defendants the numerous parties just mentioned and
might permit foreclosure of their interests by action in rem. More probably, "this Act" refers to the amending act of 1943 which added this sentence and which contained in the next paragraph the provisions for foreclosure by publication when taxes for five years had been forfeited. Thus,
forfeiture foreclosures, although usually in personam, may be in rem when
taxes for five years have been forfeited and when notice is given by publication.
The procedure is as in equity foreclosures except as modified by the special requirements of the tax statutes.88 Hundreds of tracts can be joined in
86

The Attorney General says that the owner need not be made a party defendant under this
provision but for safety should be made a defendant where known. Ops. 111. Att'y Gen. (1943),
at 218.
s7Ill. L. (1943), p. iI I.
88 Clark

v. Zaleski, 253 Ill.
63, 97 N.E. 272 (1911); Ops. Ill. Att'y Gen. (I93I), at 147; see

People v. Cant, 260 Ill. 497, 501, io3 N.E. 232, 233 (1913).
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one foreclosure.8 9 The judge decides the issues raised by the answer, if any,
determines the correct amount of taxes, penalties, and interest due against
each parcel, and orders payment of that sum within a "short day," and on
nonpayment orders the sale of the property. 90 He usually requires advertisement of the sale for three successive weeks. 9' Since the law is not clear
whether the sale is governed by the Revenue Act as in tax sales or by the
decree as in equity foreclosures, one state's attorney recommends that the
decree require the sale to be carried out according to the terms of the
92
Revenue Act.
The sale is by the county collector to the person offering to pay the
most for the property regardless of whether the highest offer is more or less
than the taxes due. If the bid is less than the accumulated taxes, as is almost always the case, probably no deficiency judgment can be rendered
against the owner since the statute makes no provision for such judgment. 93 In almost every instance the property is bid off by the person making the guaranteed bid.
The power of the county to bid in the property at a tax foreclosure sale
is in doubt. The Supreme Court has held in one case that "there was no
error" in the county purchasing and that "in any event" this is "a question in which the plaintiffs in error are not interested."94 Nonetheless, the
Attorney General says that a purchase by the county would be ultra vires
and distinguishes this case on the ground that only an owner was objecting.95 Municipalities have been denied the power to purchase at annual
tax sales in the absence of an enabling statute9' and the Scavenger Act
expressly gives taxing bodies power to bid. If the county could bid, it
could foreclose to acquire properties for public purposes, could foreclose
properties even without guaranteed bids, and by its bidding prevent them
from going for a song. Opponents of county bidding fear that it would put
the county into the real estate business with properties so acquired. When
89For example, People v. Anderson, 380 Ill.
I8, 43 N.E. 2d 997 (1942); Village of Downer's

Grove v. Glos, 307 Ill.293, x38 N.E. 594 (X923).
90Mix v. People, ii6 Ill.265, 4 N.E. 783 (i886).

91Daniels, Handbook for Illinois.Tax Foreclosures 25 (c. 1943); Clark v. Zaleski, 253 Ill.
(four weeks' publication).
63, 68, 97 N.E. 272, 275 (i9)
92 Daniels, Handbook for Illinois Tax Foreclosures 24, 28 (c. I943).
93Ops. Ill. Att'y Gen. (1938), at i69.
o

94 People v. Straus, 355 Ill.
64 , i89 N.E. 877 (i934); cf. Douthett v. Kettle, 104 Ill.
356,
36o (1882) (county authorized to purchase on sale on personal judgment for taxes).

5sOps. Ill.
Att'y Gen. (1937), at 283.
491 (i88i); see O'Connell v. Sanford, 256 Ill. 62,
96City of Champaign v. Harmon, 98 Ill.
99 N.E. 885 (1912).
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it had purchased, moreover, the county would probably be obliged to account to the other taxing bodies for their proportional share of the bid and
to pay taxes on the property until it was devoted to a tax exempt public
97
purpose.
The proceeds of the sale are distributed pro rata among the taxing
bodies according to the proportion of their tax claims. The county can
only deduct the costs of foreclosure. In one case the county attempted to
deduct from a sale price of $3,553 costs of foreclosure amounting to
$228.38 and costs and redemption fees on the tax sales of previous years
amounting to $2,275.40, leaving a balance of only $I,049.22 to be distrib-

uted pro rata; but the court held that taxes, penalties, interest, and costs
on tax sales of previous years are equal items and must share pro rata98
The fact that the county receives a pro rata share of the proceeds for
penalties has in Cook County been a focal point for criticism. The county
has been accused of waiving all penalties and a portion of the principal of
taxes due in accepting guaranteed bids on foreclosure and then receiving a
pro rata share of the proceeds on the basis of its right to the penalties. 99
The county's reply has been that its taxing power is limited by the constitution to $0.75 per $ioo, that its share of the proceeds has been spent
for the public welfare, and that if this revenue source be taken away another must replace it.o ° In this connection it should be noted that the
county loses by foreclosing only on taxes through i94o (now 1946 on va-

cant property) and insisting on the payment of taxes and penalties for
1941 and subsequent years in full. The bidder in fixing the amount he can
bid at the foreclosure will deduct the subsequent taxes and penalties which
he must pay in full from what he is willing to pay for the property, so that
the larger the subsequent taxes and penalties the smaller the foreclosure
bid. This decline in the bids as subsequent taxes and penalties increase is
illustrated in the figures for 1942-48.

Smaller bids mean that a smaller

part of the recovery (foreclosure bid plus taxes and penalties 1941 to date)
is apportioned to the earlier years when the county's share for penalties is
large and more to the later years when its share for penalties is less.
The sale clears the land of the lien for delinquent taxes.Y The lien is
not revived by redemption or by the failure to take out the tax deed.o3
97 Cf. Ops. Ill. Att'y Gen. (1944), at 194.
98 People v. Anderson, 380 Ill. 158, 43 N.E. 2d 997 (1942); see

Ops. Ill. Att'y Gen.

(1942),

at 285.
99 Chicago Sun, p. 24, col. 5 (March 30, 1942).
100 Chicago Sun, p. 24, col. 5 (Vlarch 30, 1942);

1942).

Io

272 (I911).

ibid., p. 12, col. 7 (March 29,
Brennan, op. cit. supra note i. xo2Clark v. Zaleski, 253 111. 63, 97 N.E.
X03French v. Toman, 375 Ill. 389, 31 N.E. 2d 8oi (1940).
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The statute makes no provision for certificates of purchase at foreclosure

sales so that it would seem that the certificate should be the same as that
at the regular tax sale, that is made out by the clerk and countersigned by
the collector. But on the basis of two cases reaching the Illinois Supreme
Court where the certificates involved had been made out by the collector
and attested by the clerk, the Attorney General has given the opinion that
the provisions of the revenue act for tax sales do not apply and that the
certificate should be made out by the collector and attested by the clerk.104
Cautious attorneys try to satisfy both requirements by having the certificates signed by both officers.IoS
After the sale the proceeding comes back to the judge for confirmation
of the sale where the most important issue usually is the adequacy of the
bid. The courts have repeatedly applied the rule that "Mere inadequacy
of price is no reason for upsetting a judicial sale unless there are other irregularities. '"" 6 This rule has been applied even where the party attempting to set aside the confirmation introduced evidence tending to show that
the bidder would have been willing to pay twice his bid. 0 But in People
v. Schwartze°5 the Supreme Court pointed out that this rule applies where

parties are seeking on appeal to set aside the confirmation of a sale and
does not govern the chancellor himself on the issue of confirming the sale.
The chancellor has broad discretion in approving or disapproving the sale
and may consider the adequacy of the price in making his decision. In this
case the bid was $i,5oo for property assessed at $5,414 (the court does not
mention an increase to $19,485 in 1943), with back taxes through i94o of
$4,o4o.99, a total delinquency including interest and penalties of $10,414.-

63, and a gross monthly income of $200. The court emphasized the amount
of the assessment and the fact that the bid could be repaid from gross income in less than eight months to justify the chancellor's disapproval of
the bid as inadequate. It did not, apparently, consider the taxes and
penalties for I941-44, amounting to $2,650, but here these had apparently
already been paid. Subsequently a bid of $3,ooo was accepted.
The amount of the bids deemed acceptable is crucially important in
determining how much the tax foreclosure process will be used. Approval
104Ops. Ill. Att'y Gen. (1943), at 244; see Clark v. Zaleski, 253 Ill.
63, 68, 97 N.E. 272, 275
(i9I').
s05
Daniels, Handbook of Illinois Tax Foreclosures 28 (c.1943).

t6 People v. Anderson, 38o 111. 158, 162, 43 N.E. 2d 997, 1000 (1942); People v. Sandvoss,
320 Ill.
App. 239, 5o N.E. 2d 770 (x943); People v. Home Real Estate Improvement Corp.,
316 Ill.
App. 437, 45 N.E. 2d 289 (1942).
App. 466, 56 N.E. 2d 5o (1944).
107 People v. Cutler, 323 Ill.
xoS397 Ill.
279, 73 N.E. 2d 279 (1947).
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of low bids encourages use of the forfeiture foreclosure process in clearing
up back taxes and releases land for development but also deprives the
taxing bodies of revenues and discourages the payment of taxes currently
by the prospect of foreclosures at less than face value after delinquency.
Requiring high bids may halt the use of the forfeiture foreclosure process
altogether because the purchaser acquires a title subject to many of the
infirmities of a tax title, must pay full taxes, penalties, and interest 1941
to date, and must wait out a two-year period of redemption. The Chicago
Bar Association has recommended that forfeiture foreclosures be permitted on taxes through 1945, but the county believes that such a shift would
apprise taxpayers that they need not pay taxes but may settle them by
foreclosure after a few years delinquency. On April 21, 1949, the Board of
Commissioners of Cook County relaxed its opposition by resolving to
permit foreclosures of taxes through 1946 on vacant property. Actually it
makes absolutely no difference how many recent years' taxes are required
to be paid in full as long as these taxes and penalties do not exceed what
purchasers are willing to pay for the property. The purchaser determines
the total amount he is willing to pay and then divides that sum between
the bid on taxes of 194o and earlier and the payment in full of subsequent
taxes: the larger the amount required to pay subsequent taxes, the smaller
the amount he will bid. The requirement that taxes after 194o be paid in
full thus amounts merely to fixing a minimum amount, increasing year by
year, that a purchaser must pay to foreclose. Since this minimum amount
is now approaching the value of the poorer forfeited properties remaining,
the use of forfeiture foreclosures is declining and, unless some revision is
made, in a few years may cease altogether.
The figure of 40 to 5o per cent of the full assessed valuation has been
suggested as a minimum bid. 0 9 The Special Committee on Delinquent
Taxes of the Chicago Association of Commerce recommended a minimum
bid of 4o per cent full value, estimated that other costs of acquisition
would increase purchase costs to 6o or 70 per cent of full value, and would
leave 30 to 40 per cent as an incentive to purchase and compensation for
the delay of two or three years in obtaining title11° It is not clear whether
these minimums are intended to apply to the bid only or to the bid plus
subsequent taxes required to be paid in full; they should take into consideration the subsequent taxes. This discount of at least 5o per cent is the
lo9 Rees, A Study of Real Estate Tax Delinquency in Chicago and Cook County 28 (Committee on Public Expenditures, Feb. x938) (4o per cent); Daniels, Handbook of Illinois Tax
Foreclosures 7 (c. 1943) (So per cent).
lio Special Committee on Tax Delinquency of the Chicago Ass'n of Commerce, Tax Delinquency in Chicago and Cook County Illinois 3o (Feb. Io, 1941).
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collection loss suffered from being obliged to dispose at an involuntary
public sale, to allow at least two years for redemption, and to offer only an
uncertain title.
The statute expressly provides that the sale is with "the same notice to
interested parties and right of redemption from said sale, as is now provided by law and in conformity with Section four (4)and five (5)of Article IX
of the Constitution of this State." In Clark v. Zaleski,- the Supreme Court
decided that the right of redemption ran for two years as required by the
Constitution and the Revenue Act and not for the fifteen months of the
Chancery Act, that the notice required was that now contained in Section
263 of the Revenue Act, but that the affidavit of notice in Section 265 was
not required. The court reasoned that the affidavit of notice is necessary
in an annual tax sale to preserve matter not anywhere of record but is not
necessary in a tax foreclosure because the court's confirmation puts compliance with the notice in the record. The technical requirements for the
notice of expiration of redemption are the same as those in the annual tax
sales.
Whether the period of redemption is subject to the extensions provided
in the Revenue Act when subsequent taxes are not paid for two years, a
deed is not taken out within one year, or one of the owners is a minor or insane and whether the Reconveyance Act applies to permit the owner to
demand reconveyance when possession is not taken within one year or
when taxes are not paid for seven successive years, is uncertain.11 The
reference to the Constitution might be taken to limit the redemption to
the two years there provided, but the reference to the Revenue Act might
bring in all the extensions. The cases indicate that the period of redemption is extended if the purchaser permits the property to be again sold for
taxes before the last day of the second annual tax sale.Y3 These cases suggest that the other extensions of redemption are applicable, but they leave
open the question whether the Reconveyance Act applies.
Since there is no penalty bid, redemption is made upon payment of the
interest rate prescribed by the statute, now i per cent per month for the
first six months and 6 per cent per year thereafter. If the owner redeems
his tax foreclosed property shortly after the sale, this interest would be insufficient to compensate the purchaser for his expenses in attending and
bidding in the property at the sale. To compensate purchasers more ade-

111
253 Ill.
63, 97 N.E. 272 (Igi1). The court cannot regulate the right of redemption.
People v. Thain, 392 Ill.
592, 65 N.E. 2d 344 (1946).
112

§§ 253, 254.

13People

v. Banks, 294 Ill.
464, 128 N.E. 576
2d 344 (1946).

(1920);

People v. Thain, 392 Ill.592, 65 N.E.

HeinOnline -- 16 U. Chi. L. Rev. 679 1948-1949

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

quately in the event of early redemptions, a bill in the 1947 legislature
would have increased the interest to io per cent for the first six months or
fraction thereof."4 The mechanics of redemption-whether governed by
the Judgments and Decrees Act or the Revenue Act-are also uncertain.
One state's attorney recommends compliance with the former statute by
endorsing a certificate of redemption on the certificate of purchase and recording the same, followed by compliance with the latter by surrendering
the certificate to the county clerk and obtaining a certificate of redemption."S
Upon the expiration of the period of redemption and upon compliance
with the requirements of notice the purchaser may petition the court to
order the issuance of a tax deed. The jurisdiction of the court in which the
foreclosure was conducted to approve the notice of the expiration of redemption and order the issuance of the deed was upheld in Clark v. ZaleskiP " and is the outstanding instance where the courts have not limited
foreclosure proceedings to the precise steps outlined in the statute. Recourse to the court for confirmation is optional, for the purchaser may
simply get the deed from the county clerk as in the case of ordinary tax
deeds. Since, however, a petition to the court and approval of issuance is
judicial confirmation of the validity of the notice of redemption and all
prior steps and is binding upon all parties, confirmation greatly improves
the purchaser's title. The court requires the same particularity in the allegations of the notice of expiration of redemption in the petition for confirmation that it requires in the affidavits submitted in the tax judgment
7
and sale process."
The title thus obtained by the process of forfeiture foreclosure is superior to that obtained by the tax judgment and sale process largely because
of two circumstances: First, all persons interested in the property have
been served and brought before the court in the forfeiture foreclosure, and
after an opportunity to contest illegal taxes, their interests have been cut
off by judicial sale. Second, the court has ordered the issuance of the tax
deed and thus confirmed the legality of prior proceedings including the
notice of the expiration of redemption, and its order is binding upon all
parties unless reversed on appeal. The proceedings thus avoid the ex parte
character which has probably been responsible for most of the uncertainties of title in the annual tax judgment and sale. Moreover, the sale is
11II. H. B. 712, 65th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (May 14, 1947).
X15Daniels, Handbook of Illinois Tax Foreclosures 30 (c. 1943).
zX6253 Ill. 63, 97 N.E. 272 (1911); see also Hammond v. People, 178 Ill. 503, 52 N.E. o3o
(I899).
"17

People v. Banks, 272 Ill. 502, 112 N.E. 269 (1916).
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made to the highest bidder, so that the owner can less readily gain the
sympathy of the courts on the ground that he is losing his property for a
fraction of its value.
The Illinois Supreme Court by Greenwald v. McCarthy,"x8 decided in
1949, has given substantial protection to titles based on forfeiture foreclosures. Here the plaintiff sought to set aside the tax deed obtained on
foreclosure in 1941 on the grounds that the affidavit of nonresidence erroneously stated her residence was unknown despite the fact that the 1932
tax records and certain special assessment records showed her then New
York address, that the sale price was grossly inadequate, that the published notice of expiration of redemption gave the wrong date, that the
purchaser at the tax sale and his assignee were in collusion with the attorney causing the foreclosure action to be filed and were therefore chargeable with notice of defects in the proceedings, and that the foreclosure deprived her of property without due process of law. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the court had
jurisdiction of the plaintiff in the tax foreclosure action so that collateral
attack on the title failed. It pointed out that the plaintiff did not allege
that her 1941 New York address was available or that notice to the other
addresses would have reached her. It held that, so far as the record
showed, the present owners were innocent third parties whose titles could
not be attacked by proof of a false affidavit. It also held that the confirmation of the issuance of the deed by the court precluded collateral attack on
the ground that the date of expiration of redemption was erroneously
stated. This decision is in striking contrast with the technical strictness
with which the court has treated titles acquired through annual tax sales,
and should improve the marketability of tax titles.
Nevertheless, the forfeiture foreclosure has not afforded a desirable
means for buyers to pick up real estate. The title is still somewhat uncertain, the proceedings are expensive, and the purchaser must wait at least
two years and perhaps more for the period of redemption to expire. The
McCarthy case increases the security of the titles but does nothing about
the two year delay for redemption.
The result is that most tax foreclosures are carried out in cooperation
with the owner of the right of redemption. The tax purchaser is usually a
dummy, and the person for whose benefit the sale is being conducted redeems from the dummy. This person, who may be either the original owner or his grantee, then has a good title clear of the taxes. Finally, he sues
to enjoin the collector from collecting that portion of the delinquent taxes
118402 fll. 135, 83

N.E.

2d 491 (I949).
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that was not satisfied by the sale.- 9 This type of foreclosure is usually denominated a "voluntary forfeiture foreclosure" to indicate that it is carried out in cooperation with the owner, as contrasted with an "involuntary forfeiture foreclosure" (perhaps more accurately described as an "adverse foreclosure") carried out on behalf of a stranger. Although there are
no statistics on the respective use of the voluntary as compared with the
involuntary method, observers estimate that in Cook County 90 per cent
of the foreclosures have been voluntary.
The legality of voluntary foreclosures was upheld in Frenchv. Toman.- °
Lola M. French had obtained title to a piece of property on which the
taxes of 1927 to 1937 were delinquent. Her title was acquired after the
1937 taxes became a lien. A forfeiture foreclosure decree found $7,466.47
due, and the collector sold for $2,200 to one Snyder who assigned to Murphy. Lola French redeemed from Murphy and brought this suit to enjoin
collection of the balance of taxes due. The court held that the phrase the
taxes remain a lien "until the same are paid" referred not exclusively to
full payment but also to payment of the amount of the foreclosure sale,
that the sale extinguished the tax claim, and that the redemption did not
revive the tax lien. On the latter point the court used the analogy of a
junior encumbrancer who on redemption takes free of any lien for unpaid
portions of the debt not realized at the sale, and emphasized that the statute did not provide for reviving the extinguished lien. However, it carefully left open two situations: First, it pointed out that here there was no
claim of collusion between the owner and the tax purchaser. Second, it
said:
The argument that to allow a taxpayer to default and later redeem for a smaller
amount is unfair to the State and other taxpayers does not apply to this case. Appellee was not the taxpayer when the taxes were assessed. The significant fact is that
the legislature has not provided that the tax lien be revived where one who owns the
property when the taxes were assessed conveys to another, and the grantee redeems
from a tax foreclosure sale.
The first exception for collusion between the owner and the purchaser
would cover most tax sales conducted in this manner, for in almost every
instance the tax purchaser is a dummy for the owner or for a prospective
grantee of the owner. The second exception where the redeemer was the
owner at the time the taxes fell due can usually be avoided because the occasion for the elimination of delinquent taxes usually is a transfer of the
ownership. The new owner would not be liable for the taxes, and an ar119The Chicago Title & Trust Co. requires an injunction whenever the taxes and penalties
not satisfied by the foreclosure sale bid exceed $7500.
120 375 Ill. 389, 396, 31 N.E. 2d 8oi, 8o4 (i94o).
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rangement can usually be made so that the new owner redeems. A 1943
amendment that taxes are a lien only "until the real property is sold pursuant to any provisions of this Act" may have cured both exceptions.
The result of the use of redemption is that the forfeiture foreclosure
ceases to be a means of collecting taxes and becomes a means of totally
extinguishing tax liens for a fraction of their face amount. What the method can accomplish in extinguishing tax claims while leaving the owner most
of the value is illustrated by the situation revealed in People ex rel.
Schreiner v. Couriney.'2' In i937 Mildred F. Lindop acquired title to a
tract of land as trustee for John C. Lindop. The property was assessed at
$13,974, and the taxes were delinquent from 1931. In 1939 she contracted
to sell the property to the Chicago Rivet & Machine Co. for $3o,ooo, subject to 194o taxes. Instead of paying the delinquent taxes with interest, a
total of $16,245.09, the parties instituted a tax foreclosure suit, the property was sold to George Ott for $5,500, the amount of the guaranteed bid,
and the rivet company redeemed from the sale and enjoined collection of
the deficiency. In a taxpayer's suit against the former owners, the present
owners, the purchaser, the state's attorney and his assistants and bondsmen, and the Board of County Commissioners, to declare the property
still liable for the deficiency or to hold the defendants personally liable,
the court denied relief. Another illustration is the county board's recent
approval of a guaranteed bid of $277,698 on $1,3oo,ooo back taxes of the
Auditorium Hotel Building after Roosevelt College had paid the owners
$5oo,ooo for the building.122 The college probably regarded the building as
worth approximately $777,00o, the sum of the amount it paid for the
building and for the back tax settlement. Even though the back taxes, a
prior lien, were almost twice this sum, ineffective tax collection methods
enabled the owners whose interest was subordinate to the taxes to retain
two-thirds the proceeds.
At its best, voluntary foreclosure is a sale by the owner of his period of
redemption and ability to convey good title, that is, of his willingness to
cooperate by redeeming and conveying the property. Without his cooperation the person interested in purchasing at the foreclosure sale would have
to wait out the period of redemption and take his chances on the title.
He is willing to pay substantial sums to avoid the inefficiency of the foreclosure process. The proposals for minimum guaranteed bids of 40 to 5o
per cent of assessed value indicate that the owner's cooperation is worth
121380 IIL. 171, 43 N.E. 2d 982 (1942).
122Chicago

Sun-Times, p. 27, cal. i (June

29,

1948); cf. Chicago Sun, p.

1942).
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about half the value of the property. But at their worst, voluntary foreclosures have enabled owners to retain much more than even liberal payment for their redemption. The bids actually accepted in the few cases
that have reached the courts, the figures on percentages of taxes recovered,' 23 together with the fact that critics find it necessary to suggest
minimum bids of 40 to 50 per cent, all indicate that often much less than
half is realized from properties foreclosed. The lack of vigilance of the collector, the Board of County Commissioners, and the state's attorney in
many instances has enabled owners to avoid payment of taxes and to obtain sums for their ownership which according to priority belong to the
taxing bodies.
The problems of the foreclosure of special assessments require separate
discussion. The liens of special assessments and general taxes are on a
parity,"4 and the two may be foreclosed together in the same suit."15 Section 56 of the Local Improvement Act also authorizes the municipalities
to sell the assessment lien, and either the municipality or its assignee may
bring an action to foreclose the lien in its own name without any forfeiture
as a prerequisite"26 The chief importance of special assessments lies in
their effect upon the foreclosure process. If there are delinquent special
assessments in addition to delinquent general taxes, the purchaser at a
foreclosure sale will take the former into account by reducing the amount
he will bid for the property. Further, once the delinquent general taxes
have been cleared away by foreclosure, the specials remain unchallenged
as a prior lien. Where the taxes have been paid off for only a fraction of
their face amount, the specials now stand a good chance of being paid in
full.- 7 In order to prevent the presence of special assessments from depressing or eliminating altogether the bidding and to prevent special as123 There is no information on the relation of foreclosure bids to assessed values, but the relation of bids to principal of delinquent taxes (not including penalties) has ranged on improved
properties from an average of 67 per cent in 1942 to 3i per cent in 1948 and on vacant properties
from 5o per cent to 23 per cent. See Brennan, op. cit. supra note i. Assuming the high tax rate
of 4 per cent, taxes would have to be delinquent for 25 years before delinquent taxes equaled
assessed values. More likely, most properties were delinquent only half that long or less (192840) so that percentages of recoveries to assessed value would be only half as large as the percentages of recoveries to principal taxes, that is 33 to 25 per cent and 25 to 12 per cent. The
higher percentage in each instance is probably more nearly correct, for in the later years to
which the lower percentages relate purchasers had in addition to spend large sums to pay taxes
after 1940 in full.
124People v. Taylorville Sanitary District, 371 Ill. 280, 20 N.E. 2d 576 (1939).

" People v. Sandvoss,

320 Ill. App. 239, 5o N.E. 2d 770 (i943).
-6 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947), C. 24, § 84-56.
"7 Cf. Village of Westchester v. Holmes, 390 Ill. 436, 62 N.E. 2d 420 (945) (special assess-

ment bondholders not entitled of right to a refunding which would extend their lien in full after
foreclosure of general taxes for a fraction).
i
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sessment bondholders from obtaining more favorable treatment than the
taxing bodies, specials and generals should be foreclosed together. Some
attorneys foreclose specials first, while general taxes are still liens to discourage bidding by outsiders, and then foreclose the general taxes. In
either case attorneys instituting foreclosure proceedings must persuade the
municipal authorities to permit the foreclosure of specials or to join the
foreclosure of general taxes. Municipalities formerly were reluctant to
foreclose special assessments for fear they would be liable to the bondholders should the sale, as is likely, fail to yield enough to pay claims in full.121
Now, most municipalities will permit foreclosure of specials, and a few
have a definite policy of permitting foreclosure for 40 per cent of the specials on vacant land and 6o per cent on improved land. Some state's attorneys contend that special assessments must be foreclosed when general
taxes are foreclosed in order to assure equal treatment of the two liens and
have suggested that state's attorneys have power to include special assessments in foreclosures without the consent of the municipalitiesX29 On
April 21, 1949, the Board of Commissioners of Cook County resolved to
include special assessments in foreclosure settlements, but the procedure
has not yet been determined.
In Chicago the procedure to obtain City Council approval to foreclose
special assessments is set forth in a resolution and is similar to that prescribed to induce the county to foreclose general taxes. 30 Since a program
of foreclosing on delinquent special assessments was instituted in 1946,
about 200 cases involving 3,500 lots have been submitted to the council
and settlements have been made on 1,200 lots for two and a quarter mil3
lion dollars of assessments.' '
The administrative use to which Cook County has put the forfeiture
foreclosure has already been discussed in connection with the process itself, but the results obtained remain to be given. Up to the end of 1948,
9,707 petitions to foreclose had been approved by the county board,
117,966 parcels of property had been foreclosed, and $31,595,8o8.28 of
guaranteed bids had been accepted on delinquent taxes of 1878-1940 totaling $67,6Io,222.05.1 32 The total of taxes does not include penalties,
which might have almost doubled the total due. In addition, taxes for
=8 Report of the Taxation Committee, City Club of Chicago, Real Estate Tax Delinquency
and Tax Foreclosure Suits 6 (1941); Chicago Sun, P. 34, col. 6 (April 5, 1942).
M9 Daniels, Handbook of Illinois Tax Foreclosures 17, X9 (c. 1943).
130

Resolution adopted by the Chicago City Council April 16, x945.

X31Chicago
13

Tribune, p. 8, col. i (July 7, 1948).
'Brennan, op. cit. supra note i.
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1941-46 amounting to about $4o,ooo,ooo were paid in full.133 The guaranteed bids on vacant properties ranged from an average of 50 per cent of
the principal tax indebtedness in 1942 to 23.2 per cent in 1948 and on improved properties from 67 per cent in 1942 to 31 per cent in I948.34 The
decline in percentage of taxes recovered is attributed to the lesser desirability of the properties remaining as each year passes and the higher
amount that the purchaser must allow to pay taxes 1941 to date in full.
A variation in the Cook County use was the activity of the West Central Association in the thirties in searching out foreclosure purchasers.'3 5
The association selected a number of abandoned properties near the central business district, made a preliminary tax and title search, and filed a
foreclosure suit. It then sought purchasers to make guaranteed bids and
advance the cost of a full title search. When such a purchaser was found,
a full title opinion was obtained, the complaint was amended, the sale was
completed, and the purchaser obtained title after two years.
Downstate, Cumberland County in 1936 undertook an interesting and
successful program of foreclosing delinquent properties.' 36 The county
contracted with an attorney to carry out the foreclosures at a fee equal to
the 1936 taxes. A preliminary written notice to all interested parties that
foreclosure would be undertaken brought payments of taxes on two-thirds
of the properties. One hundred three individual tax foreclosures were instituted against the remaining tracts. Two were never prosecuted further
because interested parties could not be located. Thirty were redeemed before the court had taken action at a time when average costs (filing fees,
summonses, and first notices, not including the attorney's fee) were
$11.76. Thirteen more were redeemed before actual sale when average
costs were $31.47. At the sale the county made a protective bid based upon
an appraisal by its finance committee. Seven more tracts were redeemed
during the two year redemption period when costs averaged $40.55. Of
the 51 tracts eligible for deed, 23 certificates were held privately and 28
were held by the county. Up to July 1939, 23 deeds had been issued, 7 to
individuals and i6 to the county, with average costs of $48.88. All except
one tract were sold for as much or more than taxes and costs. The costs to
obtain a deed would have exceeded the amount received at the sale in onethird the cases, but in fact on only 4 of the 23 properties conveyed did
X33J. of Proceedings of the Board of County Com'rs of Cook County 949 (March ig, 1948).
'34 Brennan,
135 Report

op. cit. supra note i.
of the Taxation Committee, City Club of Chicago, op. cit. supra note 128, at 5-6.

136 Walter, Use of the Illinois Tax Foreclosure Procedure for Collection of Delinquent Taxes
(Bureau of Agricultural Economics, hectographed, Feb. 1940).
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costs exceect the amount received at the sale. Most of the costs (5o-75 per
cent) were for publishing legal notices, and the remaining costs in filing
and other fees ($i2.oo per case) were paid back to the county through the
recorder's office. On the ioi properties with taxes due of $I4,477.8o,
$7,765.05 were collected. The county in addition bid in for $3,197.69
twenty-eight properties with taxes of $4,850.15 and costs of $1,369.65.
Recoveries from the sale of the properties purchased by the county were
not expected to exceed $3,30o. In addition to these costs, the attorney by
contract was paid over $2,00o. The results of this foreclosure program,
though costly, were regarded as very satisfactory, both because the recoveries of delinquent taxes were substantial and because 9o per cent of
the delinquent properties passed into the hands of persons likely to pay
subsequent taxes.
State's Attorney Lee E. Daniels of DuPage County, faced with 66,ooo
delinquent lots, one-fourth the real estate in the county, has used the foreclosure process to clear off delinquencies on 30,0oo lots. 3 7 Foreclosures
were begun against all properties on which someone would bid 5o per cent
of the actual value and in some instances against others without a guaranteed bid. 38 The staff expenses of foreclosure were paid from the io per
cent of bids which State's Attorneys outside Cook County are allowed as
a fee.
Several recommendations for improving the forfeiture foreclosure process have already been mentioned. These have included the clarification of
the county's power to bid in properties and to hold them without obligation to pay taxes, the foreclosure of special assessments with general taxes,
and a higher interest rate applicable to redemptions. Most of the criticisms
and recommendations, however, have centered around the problem of fixing standard minimum bids to the end that all taxpayers will be treated
alike and that no taxpayer will be allowed to settle for too small a part of
the value of his property. Some suggested minimnim bids would be based
on a percentage of the taxes and penalties, in one suggestion iio per cent
of the taxes and in another 88 per cent of the taxes and penalties.'39 Others
would be based on a percentage of the value of the property, usually 4o to
5o per cent of the full assessed value.' 4' On another tack it has been urged
that settlements take account of the financial circumstances of the taxpayer.' 4' The Taxation Committee of the City Club in 1941 recommended
'37

Chicago Tribune, p. 8, col. i (July 8, 1948).

138Daniels, Handbook for Illinois Tax Foreclosures 7 (c. 1943).

139 Chicago Sun, p. 28, col. 4 (April 6, 1942).
'4'

4OSee

note io9 supra.

Chicago Sun, p. 28, col. 2 (April 2, 1942); ibid., p. 10, col. 2 (April 8, 1942).
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that voluntary foreclosures be made available to all taxpayers willing to
pay the principal of taxes prior to 1938 with 6 per cent interest plus subsequent taxes and penalties in full or 55 per cpnt of the full assessed valuation; whichever was lower, and that involuntary foreclosures for io per
cent more with the county bidding be brought against taxpayers failing
to take advantage of the voluntary plan.142 Some attorneys have suggested
that foreclosures be farmed out to private attorneys as was done in CumX43
berland County.
Two recent sets of proposals contain the current recommendations for
change in forfeiture foreclosures. House Bill 712 in the 65 th General Assembly would have increased the redemption interest to io per cent for the
first six months, required that tax districts with special assessments be
named defendants, expressly permitted-the foreclosure notices to list more
than one lot or tract, eliminated the requirement that sales be conducted
under the supervision of the court, and added a provision to foreclose
properties with taxes forfeited for five years on deposit of 25 per cent of
the current assessed valuation or the total of the tax liens, whichever was
less. The Chicago Bar Association in 1948 recommended that the state's
attorney include delinquent taxes down to 1945 in the foreclosure, that the
county board authorize the state's attorney to foreclose when a bid of 40
per cent of the current assessed value is received, that the certificate of the
county clerk as to the amount of unpaid taxes on a parcel be accepted in
lieu of proof, that the state's attorney make use of the in rem foreclosure
for taxes forfeited for five years, testing its constitutionality if necessary,
and that the City of Chicago be named defendant and be required to counterclaim for foreclosure on all parcels with delinquent special assessments.
The association in April 1949 modified these recommendations by proposing that foreclosure actions for special assessments and general taxes be
consolidated and that bids be accepted for all delinquent taxes to date on
a graduated scale ranging from 40 per cent of all taxes, special assessments,
interest, and penalties due on lots assessed at $3,0oo to $io,ooo down to
25 per cent on lots assessed at less than $i,ooo. The substitution of the
total of taxes, etc., for the current assessed valuation as the base against
which bids are to be measured seems unfortunate, for this total bears no
necessary relation, as the current assessed valuation should, to the market
value of the property which the county should be able to realize on sale.
The Illinois Revenue Laws Commission has just recommended provision for a fifth method of handling forfeitures, namely "that the State's
142
Taxation Committee, City Club of Chicago, op. cit. supra note 128, at 8.
143 Chicago Sun, p. 3o, col. 5 (April 3, 1942).

HeinOnline -- 16 U. Chi. L. Rev. 688 1948-1949

FORFEITED REAL ESTATE TAXES IN ILLINOIS

Attorney be permitted to file a suit in equity to terminate the right of taxpayers to redeem from forfeitures where a parcel of real estate has been
forfeited for non-payment of taxes of ten or more years and to vest clear
title in the State."' 44 The county boards would then sell the properties and
distribute the proceeds. Senate Bill 344 contains this proposal. If adopted,
this procedure might prove to be inexpensive and expeditious and might
supersede the Scavenger Act as a means of collecting on properties ten
years delinquent. However, the title of the State may prove unmarketable,
for the courts have inclined toward strict construction of tax sale measures
that do not give owners personal notice and an opportunity to raise objections.
This article has discussed the four methods available to collect taxes
upon the over 250,0o0 pieces of property that continue year after year to
be forfeited to the State for nonpayment of taxes. The variety of methods
is illusory, for none has proved successful in collecting taxes. The redemption of purchase of forfeitures depends upon owners or strangers coming
forward to pay the taxes; it affords the collecting authorities no opportunity to take the initiative. The civil action for taxes requires painstaking
individual legal actions against particular delinquents and presupposes a
vigor and vigilance in the collection program that thus far has been unobtainable. The "three-officer" plan passes the same unmarketable title
as the ordinary tax sale. Both the "three-officer" plan and the forfeiture
foreclosures were designed to realize upon properties bearing delinquent
taxes exceeding their value; instead, they have become means by which
owners wipe off their taxes at a fraction of face value.
It is essential that legal methods of dealing with forfeited properties be
collection methods. That is, they must be methods which permit the county authorities to take the initiative in effective measures to collect the
taxes. They must not depend upon any action by the taxpayer (contrast
the redemption and purchase of forfeitures and the forfeiture foreclosure
on guaranteed bid) and must not be so impractical that the collecting
authorities cannot take action (contrast the civil action). They must permit the county to realize the full priority of its tax liens (contrast the fractional recoveries under the "three-officer" plan and the forfeiture foreclosures). Only the civil action and the forfeiture foreclosure seem capable
of being made collection methods.
This article can suggest no panacea or magic formula by which forfeited
taxes can be collected without expense or effort. Rather, the experiences
244 Report of the Revenue Laws Commission of the State of Illinois, submitted to the sixtysixth General Assembly, p. 25 (March x949).
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in Cumberland County and elswhere suggest that forfeiture collection
will require hard, expensive, painstaking work. The first prerequisite of
vigorous tax collection administration is the dose, whole-hearted cooperation of all county officers: the county board which has general supervisory
and budget making powers; the county collector (the County Treasurer)
who has prime collection responsibility; the state's attorney who must
bring all legal actions; the county clerk who maintains the official collection records; the county assessor whose property ownership and valuation
records will be essential material in proceeding against the large number
of delinquents; and the County Housing Authority, forest preserve districts, etc., which may take charge of properties bid in by the county. The
second prerequisite is the determination of these officers to use the methods now available to best advantage to collect taxes and their willingness
to pay the price in allocations of personnel and funds. The third is the
technical correction of defects and uncertainties in the collection methods
themselves. These corrections have been touched upon in the foregoing
discussion but are probably less important than ,determined administration.
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